Several value-like solution concepts are computed and compared in a cooperative game with incomplete information and non-transferable utility.
Introduction
By introducing the concept of "virtual utility", Myerson (1984) proposed a general notion of value for cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-called M-value generalizes the Shapley non-transferable utility (NTU) value. 1 Later, the same virtual utility approach was used in Salamanca (2016) to define an alternative value concept called the S-value, which generalizes the Harsanyi NTU value. Both value concepts reflect not only the signaling costs associated with incentive compatibility, but also the fact that individuals negotiate at the interim stage (i.e., after each player has received his private information). De Clippel (2005) and Salamanca (2016) show that the M-value differs from the S-value in that the former is less sensitive to some informational externalities. In this short note we analyze a simple example of an NTU game in which these two solution concepts differ because of the way payoff strategic possibilities of subcoalitions are handled. 2 We also study our example under the assumption of ex-ante negotiation. In that situation, the players make coalitional agreements before they learn their private information, so that they are symmetrically informed at the time of contracting.
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The Example
Let r be a parameter with 0 < r < 1/2. For each value of r, we consider the following cooperative game with incomplete information: The set of players is N = {1, 2, 3}. Player 1 has private information about one of two possible states, T = {H, L}, which happen with prior proba- In this game, player 3 can be considered as weak in the sense that he can only offer players 1 and 2 a payoff that is strictly lower than what they both can get by acting together in coalition {1, 2}. Then it does appear that coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} are less likely to form than {1, 2}. Moreover, the smaller r is, the less utility player 3 can transfer to players 1 and 2, and therefore the less likely it should be that {1, 3} or {2, 3} form.
A mechanism for coalition S ⊆ N is a pair of functions
Both mappings, µ S and x S , are measurable w.r.t. the information of the members of S . The component µ S is a type-contingent lottery on the set of feasible decisions for S , while x S is a vector of type-contingent utility decrements (free disposal). The mechanism µ S (S N) stands as a threat to be carried out only if N \ S refuses to cooperate with S . We denote by F S the set of mechanisms for coalition S .
In this game, efficient allocations can be made incentive compatible, by which incentive constraints are not essential. We shall thus assume that all information is public at the implementation stage, which implies that any mechanism can be enforced once it is agreed upon. 4 As a result, virtual utility specializes to a rescaling of actual utility and one obtains simple expressions for both the M-value and the S-value. 5 
Contracting at the Interim Stage
For a given coalition S , we write u i (µ S , t) for the linear extension of the utility functions over µ S ( · | t). 6 We de-
Thus, λ is normal to the interim Pareto frontier at the utility allocation implemented by (μ N ,x N ).
Fix a vector λ of utility weights as above. Given a coalition S and a mechanism (µ S , x S ), the virtual utility of players in state t is defined as
Consider the fictitious game in which, conditionally on every state t, virtual utilities are transferable. The worth 3 This definition is adapted from the mechanisms with sidepayments considered by Myerson (2007) . For any finite set A, ∆(A) denotes the set of probability distributions over A. 4 Here, the only issue is the revelation of private information at the negotiation stage. 5 In Myerson's (1984) terminology, the Lagrange multipliers associated with the incentive constraints can be set to zero. 6 Decisions available to any coalition S do not affect the utilities of the players in N \ S . Thus, u i (µ S , t) is well defined. of coalition S ⊆ N in state t ∈ T , when its members agree on the mechanism (µ S , x S ), is defined to be
For a given profile of threats, η, t) ) denote the Shapley TU value of player i in the game W λ (η, t). A mechanism (μ N ,x N ) for the grand coalition is (virtually) equitable if Different NTU values can be defined depending on how the vector of threats ((µ S , x S )) S ⊆N is determined. According to the M-value, for every coalition S , (µ S , x S ) is computed solving the following problem:
For any given r ∈ ( 0, 1/2 ), the unique M-value of this game is the interim utility allocation The M-value prescribes the same allocation regardless of the value of r. Furthermore, it treats all players symmetrically. This is due to the fact that, by computing threats according to (3.2), coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} can agree on an equitable distribution of the total gains on every state, something that is not possible in the original NTU game. Thus, we may argue that threats in the M-value are not "credible". All that matters for the M-value when measuring the strength of coalitions is the maximum joint gains that can be allocated, and not the restrictions the players face when sharing such gains.
For the example under consideration, the S-value differs from the M-value only on the computation of threats for two-person coalitions. For any coalition S = {1, j } ( j = 2, 3), the S-value determines (µ S , x S ) by solving
Threats for coalition S = {2, 3} are similarly defined, except that the "egalitarian constraints" in (3.4) are replaced by
The egalitarian constraint (3.5) reflects the fact that players 2 and 3 cannot make an agreement contingent on player 1's private information, so that utility comparisons inside {2, 3} have to be made in expected terms.
Proposition 2 (S-value)
For a given r ∈ ( 0, 1/2 ), the unique S-value of this game is the interim utility allocation
= 50 − The S-value gives less to player 3 compared to the Mvalue. This is due to the fact that two-person coalitions with player 3 cannot fully distribute the total gains from cooperation in an equitable way. This lack of transferability increases as long as r decreases to 0, which explains why the S-value converges to the allocation (50, 40, 48, 0) as r vanishes. It seems that the S-value reflects the power structure of this game better than the M-value, in particular for a small r.
Contracting at the Ex-ante Stage
When contracting takes place at the ex-ante stage, players face a cooperative game under incomplete information but with symmetric uncertainty. Then we may apply both the Shapley NTU value and the Harsanyi NTU value to the characteristic function of this game. 8 The set of feasible payoff allocations for each coalition S ⊆ N is given by
Then the ex-ante characteristic function of this game is: Proposition 3 (Ex-ante Shapley NTU value) For any r ∈ ( 0, 1/2 ), the unique Shapley NTU value of the game (U, N) is the utility allocation 9 (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) = 32, 32, 32 .
(4.1)
Like the M-value, the Shapley NTU value is independent of r. Moreover, it treats all players symmetrically and ignores the fact that coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3} cannot agree on an equitable distribution of the gains. For every r, the weight of the outcome u 12 of coalition {1, 2} is the largest. Furthermore, it increases to 1 as r decreases to 0; thus the probability of player 3 getting into a coalition converges to 0. Therefore, the Harsanyi NTU value prescribes an outcome that better captures the lack of transferable utility in this game.
